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INTRODUCTION
1

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Mayne and
2
In re Rodriguez may easily escape the notice of lawyers who do not
take particular interest in lawyer discipline cases or lawyer
3
impairment issues. Neither stands out as a case contrary to
4
disciplinary case law or unjust in result —Ms. Mayne and Mr.
5
Rodriguez were both disbarred for theft. For those who are
particularly cognizant of the plight of our colleagues who suffer
from chemical dependency or mental illness, however, the
decisions are tragic, since they announce the end of the legal
careers of lawyers who engaged in misconduct while they were
impaired.
The fact that neither was entitled to mitigation of their
disciplinary sanction despite the impairments that led to their
misconduct raises the question of whether our mitigation
jurisprudence has led us closer to punishment and farther from
compassion or hope of rehabilitation. This comment explores how
lawyer impairment is addressed in Minnesota’s disciplinary
6
process, obstacles to achieving just and right decisions in cases
7
involving impairment, and the compatibility of compassion and
8
rehabilitation with the goals of lawyer discipline.
II.

BACKGROUND: MINNESOTA’S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

A. Determining the Appropriate Disciplinary Sanction
The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public and
the administration of justice from lawyers who do not properly
discharge their professional duties to clients, the legal system, and
9
the legal profession. Discipline is imposed not to punish the
1. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2010).
2. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 2010).
3. As used in this comment, “impairment” describes a mental impairment,
which may include or be a result of alcoholism or other addiction. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-429, 1 n.2 (2003).
4. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that
the decision appears “just” but it is not “right”). The same might be said of In re
Mayne. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153; infra Part IV.
5. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170; In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 163.
6. See infra Parts II and III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.1 (1991).
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lawyer, but to safeguard the administration of justice, protect the
10
public, the courts, the profession, and deter future misconduct.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s ultimate focus is on what sanction
11
will best serve these interests.
Determining the appropriate sanction requires analysis of
three factors: 1) the nature of the misconduct; 2) the cumulative
weight of the disciplinary violations; and 3) the harm to the public,
12
the legal profession, and the administration of justice. The court
looks at each case on its facts, considers both aggravating and
13
mitigating circumstances, and looks to similar cases for guidance.
10. See In re Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn. 1997) (“Discipline is
imposed not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, to safeguard the
administration of justice, and to deter potential future misconduct.”); In re
Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960) (“The purpose of
disciplining an attorney is not to punish him, but to guard the administration of
justice and to protect the courts, the legal profession, and the public.”).
11. See In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Minn. 2007) (Page, J., dissenting)
(“[M]y analysis of the case starts not from the presumption of disbarment, but
with an analysis of what sanction best serves the purposes of attorney discipline.”);
see also In re Jellinger, 728 N.W.2d 917, 922–23 (Minn. 2007) (“To further [the
purposes of the disciplinary system], we have imposed conditions on reinstatement
in many previous cases, and often those conditions have been as rigorous . . . .”);
In re Rudawski, 710 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Minn. 2006) (“The purpose of disciplinary
sanctions for professional misconduct is not to punish the attorney, but rather to
protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct
by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 2005))); In re
Pierce, 706 N.W.2d 749, 755–56 (Minn. 2005) (“The purposes of disciplinary
sanctions for professional misconduct are to protect the public, to protect the
judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well
as by other attorneys.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re
Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004))); In re Otis, 582 N.W.2d 561, 565
(Minn. 1998) (holding that disbarment was not necessary to protect the public);
In re Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1997) (stating the court has “not only a
right to discipline disabled attorneys who engage in misconduct, but a duty to
impose discipline when it is necessary to protect the public”).
12. In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988) (citing In re Agnew, 311
N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1981)); In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1984)
(citing In re Agnew, 311 N.W.2d at 872 (Minn. 1981)). The ABA model approach
considers: 1) the duty violated; 2) the lawyer’s mental state; 3) the potential or
actual injury caused by the misconduct; and 4) the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0 (1991).
13. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Minn. 2006) (citing In re Wentzell,
656 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Minn. 2003)); In re Thedens, 557 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Minn.
1997) (“This court looks to similar cases to assist it in determining proper
discipline for attorney misconduct.”); In re Wyant, 533 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn.
1995) (“Although this court strives to be consistent with its sanctions, prior
disciplinary case law is helpful only as analogy; the facts of each case
independently dictate the appropriate discipline.”).
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While the court strives for consistency and has occasionally
indicated it relies on prior decisions to arrive at an appropriate
14
sanction and only deviates under unusual or special circumstances,
the court’s decisions reflect careful consideration of the factual
circumstances of each case and recognition that the nature of the
15
misconduct will not always dictate a particular sanction.
For example, while prior cases as well as the American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards provide that misappropriation of
16
client funds generally warrants disbarment, the court nonetheless
compares the severity of the misconduct to prior cases, the
cumulative weight of the violations, and the mitigating or
aggravating factors that may render the usual discipline
17
inappropriate. Whether a lawyer will be reprimanded, placed on
probation, suspended, or disbarred is therefore dependent on the
reasoned judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court, which has
18
the final responsibility for determining the appropriate discipline.
B. The Nature of the Misconduct
The nature of the lawyer’s misconduct involves identifying the
particular violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and with
reference to prior cases and standards, determining the

14. See In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 325 (“By analogy prior decisions are helpful
to us in arriving at the appropriate sanction. However, on occasion, unusual or
special circumstances may justify some deviation from the holdings of those
precedents.” (citing In re Gubbins, 380 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. 1986))).
15. See In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 269 (citations omitted) (“[A]ttorney
discipline cases are decided on a case-by-case basis, making the specific factual
circumstances of each case particularly important.”).
16. See In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Minn. 2007) (“We have generally said
that cases involving misappropriation result in disbarment.”); In re Jellinger, 655
N.W.2d at 316; In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 268 (“Misappropriation of client funds
constitutes serious misconduct that generally warrants disbarment.”); In re
Samborski, 644 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Minn. 2002); In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552,
555 (Minn. 1994); In re Anderley, 481 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 1992) (“This court
usually orders disbarment in cases of extensive misappropriation of client funds.”);
In re Olsen, 487 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. 1992); STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS 5.11(a) (1991).
17. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 269–70.
18. In re Edinger, 700 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Minn. 2005). A petition for public
discipline is initially brought by the director of the Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility (OLPR), reviewed for probable cause by members of a panel of the
Board of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, and heard by a referee appointed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. See MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT VOLUME I—STATE,
RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, R. 4, 9, 12, 14 (West 2010).
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19

appropriate range of discipline assessing the lawyer’s mental state.
The lawyer’s mental state relates directly to the seriousness of the
20
misconduct.
The lawyer’s mental state may have already been
determined in an underlying criminal or other proceeding, may be
21
admitted or stipulated, or may be disputed.
A lawyer’s misconduct may be intentional, knowing, or
22
negligent. Intent, the “most culpable mental state,” means the
lawyer acted with the “conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result”; knowledge means the lawyer acted
with “conscious awareness of the nature” and circumstance of
conduct but without the “conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish the particular result”; and negligence means the lawyer
failed to be “aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or
23
that a result will follow . . . .”
A lawyer’s mental state can
significantly impact the sanction imposed, since it may not only
suggest a particular sanction, but determine the extent to which
mitigating factors such as lawyer impairment may ameliorate the
24
sanction.
C. Mitigating Factors
Mitigating factors are “considerations or factors that may
25
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”
They are not defenses or factors that “excuse” or “justify”

19. Violation of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes
misconduct. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(a) (2010). The violation must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Waite, 782 N.W.2d 820, 823
(Minn. 2010). While the Minnesota cases have not explicitly followed the two-step
approach of the ABA Standards on Imposing Lawyer Discipline by identifying the
nature of the ethical duty violated and the lawyer’s state of mind, they do so
implicitly. See, e.g., In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 604–05 (analyzing the nature of the
misconduct, misappropriation, and the attorney’s depressed state of mind);
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0 (1991) (outlining factors to be
considered when imposing a section).
20. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0(a) (1991).
21. See, e.g., In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2006) (admitting
previous conviction for fraud without the opportunity to relitigate the underlying
conviction).
22. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Theoretical Framework
(1991).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., In re Madsen, 526 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Minn. 1995) (weighing
attorney’s intentional fraud in determining his sanction); In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d
526, 529 (Minn. 1987) (analyzing the attorney’s alcoholism as a mitigating factor).
25. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991).
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misconduct; they are circumstances considered in determining
26
what discipline will best serve the public interest. The Minnesota
decisions have recognized all or substantially all of the mitigating
27
factors identified by the ABA, which include the following:
“[A]bsence of prior discipline, absence of dishonest or selfish
motive, personal or emotional problems, timely effort to make
restitution,
cooperation
with
disciplinary
proceedings,
inexperience in the practice of law, good reputation, physical or
mental disability, delay in disciplinary proceedings, imposition of
28
other penalties, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses.”
26. See In re Heffernan, 351 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1984); In re Hedlund, 293
N.W.2d 63, 67 (Minn. 1980).
27. “Most states have adopted some form of the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions or have cited them for support.” ABA/BNA, LAWYER’S MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REFERENCE MANUAL 101:3101 (1998) [hereinafter
ABA/BNA]. The Minnesota Supreme Court has relied on the ABA Standards in
identifying aggravating and mitigating factors and appropriate discipline. In re
Ward, 726 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn. 2007) (considering failure to make restitution
as an aggravating factor); In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. 2006)
(identifying the appropriate discipline for felony); In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263,
270 (Minn. 2006) (consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances for
misconduct); In re Giberson, 581 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. 1998) (identifying
appropriate discipline for knowingly violating a court order or rule); In re
Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1994) (identifying appropriate discipline
for misappropriating funds); In re Swerine, 513 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Minn. 1994)
(identifying aggravating factors to consider such as victim’s vulnerability and
attorney’s failure to make restitution); In re Lochow, 469 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Minn.
1991) (identifying appropriate discipline for misconduct).
28. ABA/BNA, supra note 27, at 101:3101; see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32 (1991); see, e.g., In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 271–72
(recognizing several mitigating factors: lack of prior disciplinary history,
restitution, remorse, cooperation with director, good character and contributions
to community, pro-bono work, extraordinary stress, and receipt of counseling for
personal problems); c.f. In re Aitkin, 787 N.W.2d 152, 162 (Minn. 2010)
(determining lack of prior disciplinary history is absence of aggravating factor
rather than mitigating factor); In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Minn. 2010)
(considering a number of mitigating factors including psychological disorder); In
re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 538–39 (Minn. 2010) (explaining compliance with
rules of professional conduct is not a mitigating factor and weighing a number of
other mitigating factors); In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 2009)
(explaining cooperation is not a mitigating factor, but remorse is); In re Q.F.C.,
728 N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Minn. 2007) (determining procedural error in discipline
case can prejudice the attorney, making it necessary to dismiss disciplinary
hearing); In re Moulton, 721 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Minn. 2006) (explaining mere
compliance with obligation to cooperate not mitigating factor); In re Letourneau,
712 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. 2006) (deciding prior private probation for failure to
cooperate with director should be treated as a “neutral factor” and not given
greater weight in determining attorney discipline); In re Singer, 541 N.W.2d 313,
316 (Minn. 1996) (excluding past financial misfortune and present lack of
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The court considers mitigating factors regardless of the
29
As a result, the presence of
seriousness of the misconduct.
numerous mitigating circumstances, none of which would be
sufficient alone to avoid disbarment, may permit the court to
determine that disbarment is not necessary to achieve the goals of
30
attorney discipline. On the other hand, the severity or extent of
the misconduct and harm may dictate disbarment as the
appropriate sanction, despite the strength of the mitigating
31
factors. The court weighs the result of the three factors (nature,
cumulative weight, and harm flowing from the conduct) and the
aggravating or mitigating factors and ultimately determines what
32
discipline serves the public’s interest.

business expertise as mitigating functions); In re Jensen, 468 N.W.2d 541, 545
(Minn. 1991) (recognizing inexperience as a mitigating factor); In re Pokorny, 453
N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn. 1990) (weighing cooperation with proceedings and
attorney’s motive as mitigating factors); In re Klein, 442 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn.
1989) (including lack of selfish or dishonest motive as aggravating factors); In re
Panel File No. 87-22, 425 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing delay in
bringing action and prosecuting does not warrant reversal); In re Getty, 401
N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1987) (reducing sanction as a recognition of attorney’s
inexperience); In re Beal, 374 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing
cooperation can be mitigating circumstance); In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 393
(Minn. 1985) (requiring prejudice to attorney before a dismissal of an action for
failure to prosecute promptly).
29. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 270 (citing In re LaChapelle, 491 N.W.2d 17,
21 (Minn. 1992)); see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 4.11 & cmt.
(1991) (rejecting argument that disbarment results from misappropriation in the
absence of lack of intent, reasoning that disbarment is the usual discipline for
misappropriation but does not foreclose consideration of mitigating factors that
may render the usual discipline inappropriate). The court has similarly rejected a
per se disbarment rule for felony convictions. See In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d 192,
195 (Minn. 1982); In re Hedlund, 293 N.W.2d at 67; In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834,
841–42 (Minn. 1978).
30. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 272.
31. Id. (explaining that “whether the presence of mitigating circumstances
will allow an attorney to avoid disbarment for misappropriation depends on the
severity of the misconduct and the strength of the mitigating factors”).
32. See In re Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 240–41 (Minn. 2000). Whether the
presence of mitigating circumstances will allow a lawyer to avoid disbarment for
misappropriation depends on the severity of the misconduct and the strength of
the mitigating factors. The court weighs “the nature of the misconduct, the
cumulative weight of the disciplinary rule violations, and the potential harm to the
public, to the legal profession, and to the administration of justice.” Id. at 240
(citing In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988)).
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LAWYER IMPAIRMENT AND THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

A. Lawyers in Crisis
Chemical dependency and mental health impairments present
a significant problem for lawyers and the discipline system. The
33
American Bar Association estimates that 15% to 20% of U.S.
34
lawyers suffer from alcoholism, which is nearly twice the
approximate 9% abuse and dependency rate for adults in the
35
United States. One estimate suggests that as many as 18% of all
U.S. lawyers, or nearly one in five, will develop problems related to
36
substance abuse at some point in their careers.
The statistics regarding mental health issues are even more
startling. A 1990 Johns Hopkins study found that of twenty-eight
professions, lawyers are the most likely to suffer from depression; a
37
rate more than three times that of the general population.
33. The ABA, through its Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs
(CoLap), provides resources to “educate the legal profession concerning
alcoholism, chemical dependencies, stress, depression and other emotional health
issues and assist and support all bar associations and lawyer assistance programs in
developing and maintaining methods of providing effective solutions for
recovery.” Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org
/legalservices/colap/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2010).
34. Alcoholism is defined as follows:
[A] primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.
The disease is often progressive and fatal. It is characterized by
continuous or periodic impaired control over drinking, preoccupation
with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and
distortions in thinking, most notably denial.
Robert M. Morse & Daniel K. Flavin, The Definition of Alcoholism, 268 JAMA 1012,
1014 (1992).
35. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 50–
51 (1995–1996).
36. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225,
243 (1986); John W. Clark, Jr., We’re from the Bar and We’re Here To Help You,
GPSOLO MAG., Oct./Nov. 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice
/magazine/2004/oct-nov/werefromthebar.html; JOAN BIBELHAUSEN, LAWYERS
CONCERNED FOR LAWYERS, MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
12 (2009).
37. William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive
Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1079 (1990). A study of Washington
lawyers confirmed a 19% rate of depression as compared to a 3% to 9% rate of
depression in Western industrialized countries. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The
Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers,
13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240–41 (1990).
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Another study showed that lawyers suffer from generalized anxiety
disorder at a rate between five to seven times greater than the
general population and obsessive compulsiveness at ten to thirteen
38
times the general population.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that alcoholism or alcohol
abuse has been estimated to be a factor in at least 27% of lawyer
39
discipline cases in the United States. Precise statistics regarding
the prevalence of chemical dependency and mental health
impairments in the discipline system are hard to discern because
40
lawyers do not always raise the issue.
However, chemical
dependency or mental health was a factor for four of the twentynine, or approximately 14%, of lawyers who were placed on
41
probation in Minnesota in 2009. This is a reduction from 2008,
when 28% of the probations involved chemical dependency or
42
mental health concerns. More than one hundred cases involving
suspensions or disbarments have involved alcoholism or alcohol
abuse since 1982, and more than fifty have required lawyers to
43
prove psychological fitness to be reinstated.
The impact of lawyer impairment was addressed on a national
level more than three decades ago by the ABA’s promulgation of
standards aimed at addressing impairment in the disciplinary
44
process.
It has since created the ABA Commission on Lawyer
Impairment (now known as the Commission on Lawyer Assistance
45
Programs or CoLap); has adopted mitigation standards for
38. See Beck et al., supra note 35, at 50–51.
39. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., supra note 36, at 243.
40. The prevalence of denial in chemically dependent lawyers impacts
reporting in the disciplinary process. See Marcia E. Femrite, Addicted Attorneys in
Disciplinary Proceedings, MICH. B.J. 152, 152 (1991). Stigma and uncertainty of how
disciplinary authorities and the profession will treat addiction or mental illness
almost certainly affects the statistics as well. See BIBELHAUSEN, supra note 36, at 22.
41. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD AND
THE OFFICE OF LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (2010), available at
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Documents/2010%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
42. Id.
43. See BIBELHAUSEN, supra note 36, at 14.
44. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Preface (1991)
(referencing the ABA’s 1979 Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disciplinary
Proceedings).
45. The ABA created the Commission on Impaired Attorneys in 1988, and its
name was changed in August 1996 to the Commission on Lawyer Assistance
Programs to emphasize a broader reach and to avoid any stigma the former name
might imply. Myer J. Cohen, The Impaired Lawyer, A.B.A. EXPERIENCE, Winter 2002,
at 6, 8, available at http://www.nclap.org/article.asp?articleid=93; see Commission on
Lawyers Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/colap/
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impairment, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and opinions
48
addressing lawyer impairment; and has most recently adopted a
49
Model Rule on Conditional Admission to the practice of law.
Lawyers in Minnesota were the first in the nation to form a
lasting organization to assist lawyers with chemical abuse and
50
addiction problems.
Although Minnesota was one of the last
states to establish a lawyer-funded Lawyer Assistance Program and
51
adopt the language of Model Rule 8.3(c), its current mitigation
52
test for lawyer impairments predates the ABA mitigation standard,
53
Minnesota’s court
as does its conditional admission process.
54
decisions reflect early recognition of alcoholism as a disease that
(last updated Aug. 12, 2010).
46. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 5 (2009) (added in 2002
to suggest a need for a solo practitioner to plan for death or disability); Id. at
8.3(c) (amended in 1991 to except from Rule 8.3’s disclosure requirements
information gained by a lawyer or judge in the context of a lawyer assistance
program); Id. at 1.16(a) (requiring a lawyer to decline or withdraw from
representation if the lawyer’s mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s
ability to represent the client).
48. See ABA Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards,
Formal Op. 03-429 (2003) (discussing firms’ approach to lawyer impairment).
49. ABA House of Delegates, Model Rule on Conditional Admission to Practice
Law (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/colap/downloads
/model_rule_on_conditional_admission_aug2009.pdf.
50. The organization Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, formed in 1976, has
been administering Minnesota’s lawyer-funded Lawyer Assistance Program to assist
lawyers with chemical, mental health, and other concerns since the Minnesota
Supreme Court approved its creation in 2000. See TED COLLINS, LAWYERS CONCERNED
FOR LAWYERS: A 30 YEAR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE BAR (2006), available at
http://www.mnlcl.org/pdfs/30%20years%20of%20Help%20and%20Hope%20%282
%29.pdf.
51. See Order Amending the Rules of the Supreme Court for Registration of
Attorneys and the Rules of Professional Conduct (C9-81-1206/C1-81-1206; C8-84-1650;
C4-91-1728) (2000), available at www.mncourts.gov/rules/att_reg_prof_conduct.doc.
Rule 8.3(c) exempts information received in the context of a lawyer assistance
program from the mandatory disclosure requirements of Rule 8.3(a). See MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010).
52. See In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982) (mitigation standard
for alcoholism adopted upon the recommendation of the director of the OLPR).
Specific mitigation criteria such as that adopted in In re Johnson were not part of
the Standards adopted by the ABA in 1986 and appear to have been part of
amendments made to the Standards in February 1992. See STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991).
53. See Order, In re Rules for Admission to the Bar & In re Rules on
Professional Responsibility (C5-81-8139; C1-84-2140) (Aug. 10, 2005) (on file with
author); Judith Rush, Minnesota’s Conditional Admission Rule, WITNESS TO RECOVERY,
Summer 2005, at 1, 1.
54. State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 97, 166 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1969).
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does not indicate a lack of moral character and may be
56
considered in imposing lawyer discipline.
Abuse or addiction to other chemicals has similarly been
57
recognized as a mitigating factor.
While some court decisions
58
reflected skepticism of psychological illness as a mitigating factor,
the court nonetheless suspended, rather than disbarred, lawyers to
allow them to rehabilitate from mental illness even before it
59
officially adopted a mitigation standard for psychological illness.
Fearon represents the court’s first definitive ruling on the issue of whether a
chronic alcoholic can be said to drink by choice. The court reversed Fearon’s
conviction for voluntary public drunkenness, reasoning that Fearon “was no more
able to make a free choice . . . than a person . . . who was forced to drink under
the threat of physical violence,” and therefore his drinking was due to his disease
and therefore involuntary. See Moeller v. Dep’t of Transp., 281 N.W.2d 879, 882
(Minn. 1979).
55. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 755–56 (Minn. 1984) (focus is on bar
applicant’s behavior rather than status as alcoholic).
56. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1983) (mitigation for
psychological problems); In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618 (mitigation for
alcoholism).
57. See In re Getty, 518 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1994) (noting that cocaine is
illegal and even if, arguably, the mitigation test applied, “a cocaine dependency
should not lighten the discipline, or at least should lighten the discipline to a
lesser extent than alcohol dependency would”); In re Linnerooth, 496 N.W.2d 408,
408–09 (Minn. 1993) (public reprimand and probation for possession of illegal
drugs).
58. See In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 378–79, 215 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1974)
(“[A] careful examination of the record does not disclose sufficient evidence to
sustain respondent’s contention that any or all of these acts were the product of
his mental illness . . . .”); In re Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 542–43, 115 N.W.2d 729,
733 (1962) (treating mental illness to be an attempt to garner sympathy for
unrelated matters).
59. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279 (adopting mitigation test); In re
Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 17–18 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than disbarring
lawyer to permit him to seek reinstatement after receiving psychological or
psychiatric treatment and seeking to rehabilitate himself when he abandoned
practice, failed to pay debt or refund client funds, and neglected clients while he
was involved in a protracted dissolution proceeding and had sought psychiatric
treatment); In re O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865–73 (Minn. 1983) (holding
indefinite suspension with opportunity to seek reinstatement within two years
rather than disbarment where lawyer, because of his chronic alcoholism,
neglected client matters and made misrepresentations to them, issued fraudulent
checks, assaulted his wife, made false submissions to the court, and repeatedly
failed to cooperate with the director); In re Leali, 320 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn.
1982) (holding indefinite suspension when lawyer failed to maintain trust account,
neglected client matters, borrowed money from a client without adequate security,
abandoned his clients, and failed to pay child support in light of lawyer’s chemical
dependency and successful treatment); In re Iverson, 305 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn.
1981) (holding indefinite suspension with reinstatement subject to establishing
psychiatric and psychological fitness when lawyer’s psychological condition was
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Minnesota’s discipline system does not allow for diversion to
address chemical dependency or mental illness, but it does allow
disabled lawyers to be placed on inactive status to allow them to get
the treatment they need to regain their competence as lawyers or
61
to adequately defend a disciplinary proceeding. In addition, the
62
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (OLPR) will place
lawyers on private probation if their chemical dependency or
mental health disorders result in misconduct that does not require
63
public discipline.
However, when the impaired lawyer has
engaged in serious misconduct for which public discipline is
appropriate or where inactive status is not available, the lawyer’s
impairment may be raised as a mitigating factor in response to the
petition of the director of the OLPR to the court for public
such that it would have been difficult for him to carry out his professional duties,
despite his lack of cooperation in making himself available for an evaluation).
60. Diversion programs generally result in removal of a matter from the
disciplinary system to allow a lawyer to get treatment under appropriate
supervision and guidelines for a specific period of time. See also ABA MODEL RULES
FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(G) (2007) (describing Alternatives
to Discipline Program). See generally Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Note,
Professional Misconduct by Impaired Attorneys: Is There a Better Way to Treat an Old
Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (2004) (describing how diversion programs
provide more effective disciplinary methods).
61. See MINN. RULES ON LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 28(a) (2010),
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/RLPR/Rules%20on%20Lawyers%20Professional
%20Responsibility.pdf. A lawyer whose mental illness or deficiency or habitual use
of alcohol, narcotics, or other drugs prevents the lawyer from competently
representing clients must be placed on disability inactive status. Id. Disability
inactive status is also permitted where disability is asserted in a disciplinary
proceeding and prevents a lawyer from assisting in his or her defense. Id. at R.
28(b). In either case, a lawyer placed on disability inactive status must be
reinstated to active practice and address his or her misconduct. Id. at R. 28(d); see
also Betty M. Shaw, The Rules Regarding Disability Inactive Status, MINN. LAWYER, May
6, 2002, available at http://www.mncourts.gov/lprb/fc02/fc050602.html
(explaining that when lawyers are transferred to disability status while serious
allegations of misconduct are pending against them, the court ordinarily stays the
disciplinary proceedings during the period of disability. The court then orders
that the allegations of misconduct be considered at the reinstatement proceeding
and that a recommendation for disciplinary sanctions, if any, be made to the court
at that time).
62. The director of the OLPR has the responsibility to investigate, discipline,
and bring public charges against lawyers. See MINN. RULES ON LAWYERS PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY R. 8 (2010), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/RLPR
/Rules%20on%20Lawyers%20Professional%20Responsibility.pdf.
63. But see Betty M. Shaw, Balancing Compassion with the Need for Public
Protection, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 28, 1998, available at http://www.mncourts.gov
/lprb/fc98/fc082898.html (noting that private probation is not appropriate when
the misconduct is very serious or likely to reoccur).
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discipline.
B. Mitigation for Impaired Lawyers
The Minnesota Supreme Court has formulated two similar
standards for mitigation involving impairment, one for alcoholism
and one for psychological disabilities. A lawyer seeking to have
alcoholism considered as a mitigating factor must establish four
elements:
1.The accused attorney is affected by alcoholism;
2.The alcoholism caused the misconduct;
3.The accused attorney is recovering from alcoholism
and from any other disorders which caused or
contributed to the misconduct; and
4.The recovery has arrested the misconduct and the
64
misconduct is not apt to reoccur.
Each element must be established by clear and convincing
65
evidence. Minnesota’s alcoholism mitigation criteria are similar
66
to the ABA’s criteria. However, while the ABA Standard requires
64. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982).
65. Id. at 618–19. The clear and convincing standard also applies to
mitigation for psychological illness. In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn.
1983). This standard is more commonly applied to disciplinary counsel in
disciplinary proceedings except for petitions for reinstatement, readmission, or
transfer to and from disability inactive status, when the petitioning lawyer has this
burden. See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 18(D)
(2007). The states have adopted various approaches. See In re Sullivan II, No. 08C-12029, 2010 WL 3196271, at *3 (Cal. Bar Ct. Aug. 12, 2010) (offering party bears
the burden of proving aggravating or mitigating circumstances); In re Zakroff, 934
A.2d 409, 423 (D.C. 2007) (determining that a lawyer seeking mitigation must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had a disability and that he has
been substantially rehabilitated, but need only prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the disability substantially affected his misconduct); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 994 A.2d 928, 930 n.11 (Md. 2010) (lawyer
asserting a matter in mitigation has burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va. 2006)
(no heightened standard).
66. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992). See, e.g.,
People v. Katz, 58 P.3d 1176, 1193–94 (Co. 2002) (applying Rule 9.32(i) where
attorney raised mental disability as a factor in mitigation); In re Thompson, 911
A.2d 373, 377 (Del. 2006) (upholding ruling that attorney’s depressive disorder
only given “some weight” under 9.32(i)); In re Christian, 135 P.3d 1062, 1065
(Kan. 2006) (holding that the attorney was unable to show that his mental
disability caused misconduct as required by 9.32(i)); In re Bernstein, 966 So. 2d
537, 544 (La. 2007) (concluding that no “significant causal nexus existed” between
attorney’s mental disability and conduct under 9.32(i)); In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38,
44 (Mo. 2008) (finding that attorney’s bipolar disorder satisfied four-prong test of
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67

medical evidence, the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated
that, while more than the testimony of the lawyer is required,
medical evidence should not be the sole evidence to be
68
considered. As a result, the court has considered the testimony of
spouses, family members, and other lay witnesses in addition to
69
expert testimony and testimony of the respondent.
The ABA
Standards also expressly recognizes mitigation for other forms of
70
71
chemical and drug dependency, while Minnesota has not.
A lawyer who seeks to have a psychological disability
considered as a mitigating factor must establish the following:
1.That the attorney has a severe psychological problem;
2.The psychological problem was the cause of the
misconduct;
3.The attorney is undergoing treatment and is making
progress to recover from the psychological problem that
caused or contributed to the misconduct; and
4.The recovery has arrested the misconduct and the
72
misconduct is not apt to recur.
73
Minnesota’s imposition of a “severity” requirement is unique. The
ABA standard looks instead at whether the lawyer suffers from a
74
“mental disability.”

9.32(i)); In re Coyner, 149 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Or. 2006) (overturning trial panel’s
determination finding chemical dependency as a mitigating factor under §
9.32(i)); Albers, 639 S.E.2d at 801 (adopting STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992)).
67. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i)(1) (1992).
68. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619.
69. See In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. 1987).
70. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992).
71. See In re Getty, 518 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1994) (suggesting that cocaine
dependency may not lighten discipline to the same extent as alcohol
dependency).
72. Later decisions have broken the fourth criteria into two separate factors.
See In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2002) (listing the fourth criterion
as “recovery has arrested the conduct” and the fifth as “the misconduct is not apt
to recur” (citing In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983))).
73. The only other jurisdiction that appears to impose a severity requirement
is North Dakota. See In re Rau, 533 N.W.2d 691, 695 (N.D. 1995) (noting that the
lawyer’s lack of remorse and restitution were significant in its decision to disbar
the lawyer).
74. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992) (mitigating
factors include when “the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or
mental disability”).
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The logic of the mitigation criteria is evident. A lawyer who is
chemically dependent or has a psychological illness that is not
being effectively treated poses a risk to clients and the public.
Therefore, when a lawyer who has engaged in misconduct as a
result of his or her illness can show progress in recovery that has
arrested the misconduct and has made it unlikely to recur, the risk
to clients and the public is reduced, allowing a less severe and more
appropriate sanction to be fashioned that protects the public. On
the other hand, when the impairment has no connection to the
misconduct, the other criteria would appear to have little relevance
and presumably the illness would be treated in mitigation like
75
other personal or emotional problems.
5.Psychological Mitigation Applied: In re Mayne
Mayne was convicted of financial exploitation of a vulnerable
76
adult, a felony, as a result of her theft of approximately $60,000
77
from her ill and elderly father’s funds as his attorney-in-fact.
Mayne pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eighteen months in
custody, stayed during a ten-year probation with conditions that
78
included restitution and mental health counseling. The director
brought a petition seeking disbarment, alleging Mayne’s actions
79
violated Rule 8.4(b) and (c).

75. Mitigation for a “physical or mental disability or impairment” was
specifically identified in the mitigation Standard approved by the ABA in February
1986 to distinguish it from other personal and emotional problems because it was
the mitigating factor treated most inconsistently by the courts. See STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (h) cmt. (1986). The Standard was later amended
to its present form, which includes “mental disability or chemical dependency
including alcoholism or drug abuse” and four criteria for its application.
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992).
76. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2010). Mayne’s father was in his
mid-seventies and was in the early stages of Alzheimer’s at the time of the theft. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Mayne was suspended pending final discipline pursuant to stipulation.
To access the order see the following link and type “Mayne” in the “Last Name”
box: http://lprb.mncourts.gov/LawyerSearch/Pages/default.aspx; MINN. RULES
ON LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 16 (2010). A lawyer violates MINN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) by “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;”
and Rule 8.4(c) by “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2005).
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Following a hearing on the issues of mitigation and
80
appropriate discipline, the referee appointed by the court found
that Mayne had met some, but not all, of the psychological
81
mitigation criteria. The referee found that Mayne satisfied two of
the criteria: One, she suffered from a major depressive, recurrent,
and obsessive-compulsive disorder, which is a severe psychological
82
condition; and two, she was making progress in her treatment.
However, the referee determined that Mayne did not meet the
other three criteria “that her psychological condition caused the
misconduct, that her treatment had arrested the misconduct, and
83
that the misconduct is not likely to recur.”
The referee recommended that Mayne be suspended
indefinitely, for a minimum of five years, with leave to apply for
84
reinstatement upon expiration of her criminal probation. The
referee noted what it perceived as the court’s empathy in cases
involving significant mental health issues and its reading of prior
case law allowing for mitigation when some but not all of the
85
factors had been met, as well as other mitigating factors.
86
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Mayne’s
87
misconduct warranted disbarment. While the court affirmed the
referee’s conclusion that Mayne could not satisfy all of the
psychological mitigation criteria, it disagreed with a number of the
referee’s findings on the criteria. The court rejected the referee’s
determination that Mayne failed to prove causation by showing she
suffered from the psychological disorders at the time of the
misconduct because the record as a whole showed that Mayne
suffered for a lengthy period of time from disorders that “do not
88
manifest themselves overnight.”

80. Mayne admitted the allegations of the petition. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d
at 156.
81. Id. at 156, 157–58.
82. Id. at 157.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 161 (referring to In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007), for
the proposition that, although the psychological disability in that case did not
mitigate the intentional conduct, the disability could still be considered in
mitigating the type of discipline).
86. Both the director and Mayne took exception to the referee’s findings and
recommendations. Id. at 158.
87. Id. at 164.
88. Id. at 159.
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The referee’s second basis, that Mayne could not establish
causation because she had the ability to tell right from wrong, had,
according to the court, been rejected as mitigation criteria in an
89
intervening case.
The court agreed with the referee’s findings
that Mayne’s “disorders appear to have caused out-of-control
hoarding behavior,” the “financial strain of the hoarding may have
provided Mayne with the motive to take money from her father,”
and that Mayne’s “chaotic-decision making and deeply clouded
90
judgment may have facilitated her misconduct.”
However, because these facts showed that Mayne’s illnesses
were “at most, indirect causes of her misconduct, and indirect
causation is not enough to justify a finding of causation” this
91
criterion has not been met.
The court distinguished between
misconduct by omission and affirmative illegal actions:
If a lawyer’s misconduct consists of failing to do
something she is supposed to do—i.e., misconduct
by omission—psychological disorders such as
Mayne’s might be considered the direct cause of
such misconduct. But that is not the case here.
Mayne’s misconduct involved affirmative illegal
actions, and she has not proven that her
psychological disorders directly caused those
92
actions.
The intentionality of Mayne’s misconduct also dictated that all of
the mitigating factors must be met for the psychological disorder to
93
be considered in mitigation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify
two additional mitigation criteria.
For recovery to arrest
misconduct, the lawyer must have stopped his or her current
propensity to engage in similar misconduct rather than show the
94
misconduct was stopped by the treatment itself. The court also
clarified that showing that misconduct is not likely to recur may be
89. Id. at 159 n.2 (citing In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 861–62 (Minn. 2009)).
90. Id. at 159–60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 161 (“[W]e have considered psychological disorders as mitigating
factors in some cases where the lawyer has failed to prove all of the [mitigation
criteria] . . . we only do so in the context of unintentional or passive misconduct.”
(citing In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007))).
94. Id. at 160 (“Thus we interpret this requirement to mean that the
treatment sought by the lawyer must have stopped the lawyer’s current propensity
to engage in similar misconduct.”).
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95

demonstrated by expert opinion.
The court considered in mitigation that Mayne’s conduct took
place outside the practice of law: She was suffering from extreme
stress as a result of her home being condemned and losing her
personal property; she was making restitution; she had no prior
discipline; and she acknowledged her problems and sought
96
treatment. However, the court held that these mitigating factors
fell short of what was required to deviate from the sanctions
generally imposed for similar misconduct and were simply not
97
significant enough to outweigh the misconduct. In light of the
serious nature of misconduct, the great harm that resulted, and the
need to deter future misconduct by lawyers acting as attorneys-infact, the court held that Mayne’s misconduct warranted
98
disbarment.
6.Mitigation for Alcoholism: In re Rodriguez
Rodriguez was an attorney with a nonprofit organization that
99
By
provided low cost legal services to low income clients.
misrepresenting the terms of retainer agreements to eight clients,
he collected approximately $650 that he misappropriated to his
100
own use to buy drugs.
When he could not be located within the
state, the court suspended him from the practice of law, giving him
101
one year to move to vacate the order of suspension.
When
Rodriguez did not move to vacate, the court “deemed the
102
allegations of the petition admitted and invited briefs . . . .”
Rodriguez submitted a memorandum in which he did not oppose
the director’s recommendation of disbarment, “accepting with
gratitude the consequences of [his] addictive behavior” as a
103
“devoted member of Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous . . . .”
95. The referee had taken a “tested-in-real-life” approach and found “[n]o
one can tell at this time whether misconduct is likely to recur. The only true test
would be to give Respondent an opportunity to be tested in real life.” Id.
96. Id. at 161–63.
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id. at 163–64.
99. Jane Friedmann, Lawyer Disbarred for Misuse of Client Funds, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 29, 2010, available at www.startribune.com/local/blogs
/97396819.html.
100. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170, 170 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 171 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal
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104

Accordingly, the court ordered disbarment. A strong dissent
accompanied the court’s summary opinion, reasoning that
disbarment did no more to safeguard the public or deter future
misconduct than an indefinite suspension would, and that
suspension, which would allow the possibility of reinstatement, may
105
aid in Rodriguez’s recovery from his chemical addiction.
The
dissent would have recognized Rodriguez’s remorse and
commitment to recovery from his addictions in determining the
106
sanction.
IV.

OBSTACLES TO REACHING “JUST” AND “RIGHT”
DISCIPLINE DECISIONS FOR IMPAIRED LAWYERS

Both decisions appear to reach a just result based on current
case law. Mayne and Rodriguez engaged in serious misconduct
that undermines the trust and confidence reposed in members of
107
the Minnesota bar.
Their actions harmed the public, the
profession, and the administration of justice. Mayne failed to meet
her burden to show that she was entitled to mitigation for her
108
psychological disorder.
Rodriguez did not even attempt to meet
109
the standard.
But a closer look at the decisions raises troubling
issues about how the mitigation criteria are interpreted and how
causation is determined, resulting in confusion, inconsistency, and
denial of mitigation to lawyers whose misconduct results from their
impairments.
A. Severe Psychological Problem
As indicated above, Minnesota’s requirement of proof of a
110
The court’s
“severe” psychological problem is unique.
subsequent imposition of a requirement that the psychological
problem be a “severe psychological disorder on a recognized
111
psychological diagnostic scale,”
either reflects that the term
quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 170 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 171 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. See id. 170–71; In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2010).
108. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 160.
109. See In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170, 170 (Minn. 2010).
110. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
111. In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 2009); see In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d
321, 325 n.2 (Minn. 1988) (outlining the five psychological requirements needed
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“problem” is too imprecise or that some mistrust of psychological
112
Regardless of its source, the “severity”
illness remains.
113
114
requirement has given rise to confusion, narrow distinctions,
and a focus toward defining severe psychological disorders in
theory rather than on whether the lawyer is affected by a mental
115
disability.
The ABA Standards simply require “medical evidence that the
respondent is affected by chemical dependency or mental
116
disability.” This approach to the first criterion has the benefits of
giving appropriate deference to psychological diagnoses by
qualified chemical dependency or mental health professionals and
to mitigate misconduct).
112. See In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 378–79, 215 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1974); In re
Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 544, 115 N.W.2d 729, 734 (1962).
113. For example, the court’s decision in Farley seems to suggest that
“impairment of [Pyles’s] cognitive functions, his ability to direct actions, or to
know right from wrong” is a factor in determining severity; parties believed it
related to causation. In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d at 861 (alteration in original)
(internal quotations omitted).
114. See In re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 535–36 (Minn. 2010) (“moderate”
adjustment disorder not “severe”); In re Hanvick, 609 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.
2000) (“serious” depression testified to by expert which fell at “moderate” level of
depression on diagnostic scale, not “severe”); In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552,
554 (Minn. 1994) (“serious disorder” not “severe disorder”).
115. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1991).
“Disability” is not defined by the ABA, and a review of the case law reflects it
apparently has not been a disputed issue in discipline cases. To the extent a
definition is desired, the common definition of a disability is an “inability to
perform some function.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (9th ed. 2009). The
Americans with Disabilities Act focuses on the extent to which a condition
substantially limits “major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006 Supp. II
2007–2009). In the lawyer discipline context, the focus could be on whether a
psychological condition has interfered with a lawyer’s ability to practice in an
ethical manner. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (Ohio
2009) (addressing language of the Ohio’s Rules and Regulations Governing
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline (Ohio Supreme Court, effective June 1, 2000), which
focuses on the return of lawyers to “competent, ethical professional practice . . .”).
116. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1991).
This
approach appears to be the most widely applied. See, e.g., In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38,
44 (Mo. 2008); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va.
2006) (applying STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i)(1) (1991)); see
also Toledo Bar Ass’n, 907 N.E.2d at 1177 (requiring proof of “a diagnosis of mental
disability by a qualified health-care professional”); RULES GOVERNING THE MISSOURI
BAR AND THE JUDICIARY R. 5.285 (2010) (mitigation applied to a “mental disorder”,
which is a “condition, found in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, that
more than minimally impairs judgment, cognitive ability, or volitional or
emotional functioning in relation to performance of professional duties and
commitments . . .”), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=708.
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of properly focusing on the lawyer’s condition.
B. Causation
At the time the formal mitigation criteria were initially
adopted, the court made two important observations: mitigation is
117
not a defense to misconduct and proving causation is critical.
Nonetheless, subsequent cases, including In re Mayne, appear to
require something almost akin to the M’Naghten criminal liability
118
119
defense in psychological disability cases to prove causation.
Although the court has recently clarified that “knowing right from
wrong” is not a test of causation, it is unclear whether “impairment
120
of cognitive functions and ability to direct one’s actions” remain
tests for causation or are considered in determining the nature of
the misconduct.
121
The court’s recent clarification of “direct” causation provides
some guidance for defining causation. However, the context in
122
which it appears is troubling
and underscores the need to
117. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982); see In re Samborski, 644
N.W.2d 402, 408 (Minn. 2002); In re Anderley, 481 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. 1992);
In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. 1987).
118. See State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2007) (“[A]
defendant seeking to establish a mental illness defense must meet the M’Naghten
standard” by “prov[ing] that at the time he committed the charged offense, he
‘was laboring under such a defect of reason, from a mental illness or deficiency, as
not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.’” (quoting Bruestle v. State,
719 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Minn. 2006))).
119. See In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting a causal
relationship between depression and active misconduct because Jellinger’s
conduct demonstrated his depression had not impaired Jellinger’s “ability to
direct his actions” and “he continued to recognize that his actions were wrong”);
In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(affirming that the lawyer’s mental illness “did not result in impairment of
respondent’s cognitive functions, his ability to direct his actions, or to know right
from wrong”).
120. In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 861–62 (Minn. 2009); see In re Pyles, 421
N.W.2d at 325.
121. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2010); In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d at
862 (“Indirect causation . . . is not sufficient to justify a finding of causation . . . .”);
see In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1994) (“[R]espondent has not
proved that his psychological problems . . . caused or significantly contributed to
his misconduct . . . .”).
122. Such a standard would be troubling since, although common features of
substance addictions and other psychological illnesses can be identified, their
impact on a particular person is unique. See, e.g., In re Verra, 932 A.2d 503, 504–05
(D.C. 2007) (placing lawyer on probation because of causal relationship between
depression and misappropriation, despite strict approach that misappropriation
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articulate a standard or definition of causation, because it seems to
suggest that certain illnesses can be considered the cause of
misconduct by omission but not intentional misconduct and that
123
the illness must be the sole cause of the misconduct. Without an
articulated causation standard, it is left to the director, defense
counsel, and the referee to attempt to define and determine
causation in the first instance and for the Minnesota Supreme
Court to ultimately determine on review whether causation exists.
124
At best, this is an inefficient use of resources.
The language of the mitigation criteria suggests mitigation
applies to psychological problems that “caused or contributed” to
125
the misconduct.
Accordingly, the court has found causation
when the psychological disorder played a “significant role” in
126
and when misconduct “stems” from
causing misconduct
127
128
alcoholism.
This is consistent with the “substantial factor” test
results in disbarment); In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 44–45 (Mo. 2008) (allowing
mitigation in the case of a lawyer who misappropriated funds from a trust while he
suffered from bipolar disorder); In re Crescenzi, 51 A.D.3d 230, 234 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (presumption that intentional conversion of client funds makes lawyer
unfit to practice “can be rebutted by showing that the misappropriation caused by
drug addiction or mental illness”); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172,
1178 (Ohio 2009) (allowing mitigation for lawyer who suffered from depression
and post-traumatic stress disorder who engaged in deception and
misappropriation); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va.
2006) (allowing mitigation for criminal convictions when behavior was “affected by
depressive disorder”).
123. See, e.g., In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d at 554 (first alteration in original)
(finding that Shoemaker’s depression “vaguely contributed to his behavior,” when
Shoemaker’s expert had testified that his psychological disorder “would have been
a part of his motivation to [steal],” although it did not “account[] entirely for the
behavior”).
124. For example, a significant portion of the cross-examination in In re Mayne
was devoted to repeated questioning of Mayne’s expert regarding Mayne’s ability
to know right from wrong, which, as the expert explained, is a forensic
determination that is not relevant to diagnosis and treatment of a psychological
disorder. See Transcript of Record at 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d
153 (Minn. 2010) (No. A08-1522).
125. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983) (“[H]e must prove .
. . that the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct . . . and [he] is
making progress to recover from the psychological problem which caused or
contributed to the misconduct . . . .”).
126. In re Bergstrom, 562 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. 1997) (“Bergstrom’s severe
depression, for which he is being treated, played a significant role in causing his
misconduct.”).
127. In re Fallon, 389 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1986).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (explaining
“substantial factor”); see, e.g., Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980);
Lestico v. Kuehner, 204 Minn. 125, 133, 283 N.W. 122, 127 (1938); Peterson v.
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followed in tort cases in Minnesota, which recognizes that conduct
is a “direct cause” if it plays a “substantial part” or is a “substantial
129
factor” in bringing about the result.
“But for” causation is also
required to meet substantial factor causation, since conduct cannot
be a substantial factor in bringing about the result if it would have
130
occurred even without the conduct.
Substantial factor causation is also consistent with the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provide the
following guidance in the commentary to Rule 9.32 of the
Standards as to how the causation criteria should be applied in the
mitigation context:
Issues of physical and mental disability or chemical
dependency offered as mitigating factors in
disciplinary proceedings require careful analysis.
Direct causation between the disability or chemical
dependency and the offense must be established. If
the offense is proven to be attributable solely to a
disability or chemical dependency, it should be
given the greatest weight.
If it is principally
responsible for the offense, it should be given very
great weight; and if it is a substantial contributing
cause of the offense, it should be given great weight.
In all other cases in which the disability or chemical
dependency is considered as mitigating, it should be
131
given little weight.
Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364, 256 N.W. 901, 903 (1934).
129. See 4 MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 27.10 (5th ed. 2006 Supp. 2010–2011); see also
Kronzer v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 415, 426, 235 N.W.2d 187,
194 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) (articulating a “direct
consequences test,” which includes “[c]onsequences which follow in unbroken
sequence, without an intervening efficient cause”); Mickelson v. Kernkamp, 230
Minn. 448, 458, 42 N.W.2d 18, 24 (1950) (referring to the “substantial factor
rule”).
130. STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 129 (quoting George v. Estate of Baker,
724 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Minn. 2006)).
131. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32 cmt. (1991) (emphasis
added). Some jurisdictions have modified the second factor to incorporate similar
standards. See In re Zakroff, 934 A.2d 409, 423 (D.C. 2007) (quoting In re Verra,
932 A.2d 503, 504 (D.C. 2007) (stating that the second factor requires showing
that the lawyer’s disability “substantially affected” the lawyer’s misconduct));
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (Ohio 2009) (applying the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Rules and Regulations Governing
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline, including the second factor which requires “a
determination that mental disability contributed to cause the misconduct”). For
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The ABA commentary reflects an approach, consistent with
132
Minnesota’s definition of causation in the tort context that would
guide the director, defense counsel, and the referees. Such an
approach would also promote consistency and ensure that a lawyer
who engages in misconduct as a result of impairment but
undergoes appropriate treatment to prevent the misconduct from
recurring receives the benefit of mitigation.
As applied to whether a psychological illness caused the
misconduct at issue, the questions in each case are to what extent the
lawyer’s impairment played a part in his or her misconduct and the
likelihood the lawyer’s conduct would have occurred in the
133
absence of the illness. The focus in this determination would be
on the opinion of a qualified mental health or chemical
134
dependency professional, the testimony of the lawyer, or others.
These opinions give some insight into the reputation, practices,
and ethical behavior of the lawyer who was not impaired, the
impact the impairment had on the lawyer’s behavior, the
consistency of that behavior with the particular illness, and other
relevant considerations.
If the impairment played no role in the misconduct, and thus
the misconduct would have happened regardless of the
impairment, it is not a mitigating factor unless the court wishes to
135
consider it mitigating as a personal or emotional problem.
If a
The Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings
Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, see Appendix II
of SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO, available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/rules/govbar/govbar.pdf#App2.
132. The ABA also supports use of a “but for” approach.
See ABA
Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal Op. 03-429, n.9
(2003); see also In re Zakroff, 934 A.2d at 423 (stating that “substantially affected”
test is met by showing that “but for” disabling condition, misconduct would not
have occurred (quoting In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 327 (D.C. 1987))).
133. See, e.g., In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1987).
134. See id. at 529 (“Isaacs’ estranged wife testified that his whole life seemed to
revolve around alcohol, that Isaacs had blackouts from drinking, and that from
1980 to 1983 he drank himself into oblivion almost every night. Isaacs’ daughter
also testified that before he had quit drinking Isaacs was always drunk when out of
the office and that since he had quit drinking he was more aware of things. It was
during this period, 1980 to spring 1984, that all the misconduct other than the
Rahn incident occurred. The medical expert also stated that the criteria he used
for evaluation showed clearly how severely Isaacs’ dependency affected his life.”).
135. See In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 272–73 (Minn. 2006) (holding that
extreme stress as a mitigating factor did not outweigh the seriousness of
misappropriation); In re Heffernan, 351 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1984) (“[T]urmoil
in respondent’s personal and professional life neither excuses, justifies, nor even
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causative relationship has been established, the issue is how much
weight the impairment should be given as a mitigating factor in
considering what sanction will protect the public and serve the
purposes of lawyer discipline.
C. Partial Mitigation
The decision in In re Mayne exposes a peculiar approach to the
mitigation criteria, differing standards of mitigation for “passive”
136
The referee’s recommendation to
and “active” misconduct.
suspend Mayne was based in part on the court’s previous
consideration of psychological disorders when some, but not all, of
137
the factors had been met.
The court, in rejecting the referee’s
recommendation, distinguished these cases as mitigation only for
138
unintentional or passive misconduct.
The referee’s confusion is
139
understandable. In re Berg, upon which the referee relied, and In
140
re Jellinger, cited therein, permitted psychological mitigation of
the discipline in cases involving conduct that would otherwise have
resulted in disbarment even though not all of the mitigation
141
criteria had been met.
Berg had misappropriated funds from six different clients,
actively concealed the misappropriation, forged a client’s signature,
142
and made misrepresentations to clients. The court indicated that
Berg’s depression and anxiety could mitigate his unintentional
143
misconduct, but not his intentional misconduct.
Berg also had
made restitution, had no prior discipline, and had been suffering
144
from a terminal heart condition at the time of the misconduct.
Although the director acknowledged that Berg only met the first
factor for psychological mitigation, the court nonetheless accepted
the stipulated discipline of an indefinite suspension of no less than
five years, reasoning that it had previously considered depression in
mitigation when the psychological condition did not completely
explains his misconduct . . . .”).
136. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2010) (citing In re Berg, 741
N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007)).
137. Id. (quoting In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605).
138. Id.
139. 741 N.W.2d at 605.
140. 655 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2002).
141. In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605–06.
142. Id. at 602–03.
143. Id. at 605.
144. Id.
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145

satisfy all of the mitigation factors.
While the court’s opinion
stated that mitigation was being applied only to the unintentional
misconduct, since the intentional misappropriation and
146
misrepresentations would have justified disbarment,
the
mitigation resulted in imposition of a lesser sanction of
147
suspension.
The basis for the court’s application of mitigation was not
148
based on the facts of In re Berg but instead appeared to be based
on the general proposition that depression does not mitigate
149
intentional misconduct, for which the court cited In re Jellinger.
In In re Jellinger, the court rejected the referee’s determination that
150
Jellinger had proved the mitigation factors.
Jellinger’s expert
had testified that Jellinger’s misconduct (misrepresentations, lack
of diligence, communication, cooperation with the disciplinary
investigation, and misappropriation of approximately $19,000 while
acting as a personal representative for an estate) “was in large part
151
a result of his depressive disorder.”
Because the court was not convinced that a causal relationship
existed between the depression and the affirmative acts of
152
misconduct, causation was not met.
This conclusion, that
Jellinger’s active misconduct was not caused by his illness, became
the basis for the distinction in In re Berg between active and passive
153
misconduct.
In addition to failing to meet the causation
154
criterion, Jellinger also failed to meet the last two criteria.
Nonetheless, Jellinger’s misappropriation and misrepresentation
did not result in disbarment; he received a “stayed” disbarment
with conditions, including an indefinite suspension for a minimum
155
of two years.

145. Id. at 605–06.
146. Id. at 604.
147. Id. at 606.
148. The matter came before the court on the parties’ stipulation, which was
accompanied by a memorandum describing Berg’s physical and psychological
condition and other mitigating factors. Id. at 604.
149. Id. at 605 (citing In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2002)).
150. In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 315.
151. Id. at 314.
152. Id. at 315.
153. In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605.
154. In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 315.
155. Id. at 316.
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The principle that has now apparently emerged as black letter
law in In re Mayne, that all of the psychological factors must be met
to mitigate intentional misconduct, was applied to prevent any
mitigation for Mayne, even though it clearly ameliorated the
156
disbarment sanction in both In re Berg and In re Jellinger.
The
distinction that mitigation ameliorates passive but not active
misconduct is not borne out by the prior cases.
The court could conceivably allow a psychological problem to
be treated as a personal or emotional problem, therefore
157
mitigating without a showing of causation
to ameliorate a
sanction that appears harsh or unnecessary in light of the
circumstances of a particular case.
Nonetheless, denying
mitigation altogether for intentional misconduct is inconsistent
with the court’s prior decisions, which reject attempts to limit the
158
availability of mitigation in misappropriation and criminal cases,
and places one more obstacle to mitigation for impairment.
V.

THE BALANCE: DISBARRING IMPAIRED LAWYERS

A. Protecting the Public by Disbarring Lawyers
The difficulty with the opinions in In re Mayne and In re
Rodriguez is not necessarily that the lawyers who took money that
did not belong to them should not have been disbarred. Our
disciplinary jurisprudence certainly supports disbarment of
attorneys who engage in dishonest conduct prohibited by Rule
8.4(c), whether it results in a criminal conviction and thereby
violates Rule 8.4(b) or is prejudicial to the administration of justice
and thereby violates Rule 8.4(d). Misappropriation and other
dishonest conduct threaten public trust and client protection. The
court has the difficult job of weighing the factors in light of
precedent and the unique circumstances of each case in order to
carry out its duty to protect the public, the profession, and the
156. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 163 (Minn. 2010); see cf. In re Berg, 741
N.W.2d at 604 (“A factor that mitigates Berg’s unintentional misconduct is his
depression.”); In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 316 (“We also recognize that Jellinger’s
depression was shown to have some causative relationship to his passive
misconduct.”).
157. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.31 (1991).
158. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 270–71 (Minn. 2006) (ruling, based on the
Standards, that mitigation is available in misappropriation cases); In re Olkon, 324
N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1982) (refusing to adopt per se disbarment for criminal
conduct).
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system of justice. Ultimately, the court has to determine what
159
sanction “best serves the purposes of attorney discipline . . . .”
Mitigating factors make all the difference in the sanction a
lawyer receives for dishonest conduct. Therefore, while a felony
conviction generally warrants disbarment, mitigating factors can
160
and frequently do warrant a sanction less than disbarment.
Similarly, while misappropriation of client funds generally warrants
161
disbarment, the court has not always disbarred attorneys who
162
have misappropriated funds.
Mitigating factors are considered,
regardless of the severity of the misconduct, to determine whether
163
a less severe sanction is appropriate.
164
Disbarment is an “extreme penalty” that “exists primarily as a
necessary adjunct to criminal prosecution penalties, to protect the
public and to deter lawyers who may otherwise be tempted to
165
perform illegal acts.”
Disbarment, although not technically
166
permanent, usually is.
159. In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Minn. 2007) (Page, J., dissenting).
160. In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d at 605. As the dissent indicates in In re Andrade,
the court’s prior cases reflect discipline short of disbarment for felony convictions,
often without mention of mitigating factors. See id. at 608–09 (Page, J., dissenting)
(summarizing nine cases involving felony conduct ranging from misappropriation
charged as a felony theft to securities fraud and three million felony theft
imposing suspension or lesser discipline); see also In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 196
(lawyer convicted of two felonies suspended in light of pro bono work, good
character, as well as contrition, remorse, and counseling for character flaws that
gave a strong indication that the lawyer would not engage in unethical or illegal
conduct in the future).
161. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 268 (citing In re Olson, 577 N.W.2d 218, 220–
21 (Minn. 1998)).
162. Id. (citing In re Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Minn. 2000); In re Pyles, 421
N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 1988)); see In re Isaacs, 451 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. 1990)
(citing In re Wareham, 413 N.W.2d 820, 821 (Minn. 1987)); In re Simonson, 365
N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1985) (holding that misappropriation warrants serious
sanctions, unless substantial mitigating circumstances exist).
163. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 270–71 (considering lack of disciplinary
history, restitution, remorse, cooperation with director, good character, significant
contributions to the community, extraordinary stress, and counseling as factors
that mitigated lawyer’s misappropriation of $27,700 of client’s funds); see, e.g., In re
Hanvick, 609 N.W.2d at 241–42 (considering lack of prior disciplinary history and
restitution); In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 326–27 (considering pro bono service and
exemplary life); In re Bernstein, 404 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Minn. 1987) (considering
amount of funds, restitution, contrition, and good character); In re Heffernan, 351
N.W.2d 13, 14–15 (Minn. 1984) (considering pro bono services, personal turmoil,
and restitution).
164. In re O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. 1983).
165. In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 195.
166. See Betty M. Shaw, Disbarment—Not Necessarily Forever in Minnesota, MINN.
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Few disbarred attorneys have been reinstated, excluding early
cases that explicitly contemplated reinstatement after relatively
167
brief periods of disbarment. Imposing the most serious sanction
that can be given sends a clear message to the public and other
lawyers that the conduct is so inconsistent with the standards of the
profession that the lawyer may no longer be a member. This
sanction should not be imposed on lawyers whose misconduct
arises from their impairments and who are receiving treatment that
makes future misconduct unlikely.
B. Rehabilitation, Compassion, and Mitigation
Compassion and rehabilitation are not foreign to lawyer
discipline. An early case denied that “enlistment of a natural
human sympathy for respondent’s unrelated misfortune” could
168
deter the court from its paramount duty to protect the public.
However, the court has since recognized that disbarment has
169
consequences not only on the lawyer, but on the community, and
has exercised its discretion to make such other dispositions as it
170
It has also shown compassion for impaired
deems appropriate.
171
lawyers.
LAWYER, Aug. 1, 2005 (discussing the disbarment and reinstatement of David
Anderley and three other Minnesota attorneys).
167. Id.; see William J. Wernz, Character, Fitness & Redemption: Measuring Fitness to
Practice, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2007, at 18, 19; see Shamed Lawyer Wins Rare Reprieve,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Aug. 28, 2006, available at www.dorsey.com
/resources/detail.aspx?pub=2351.
168. In re Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960) (denial of
request by respondent who had quit practicing law three years earlier and who had
suffered a serious impairment of his eyesight for consideration of hardship).
169. See In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 196.
170. In re Hansen, 318 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn. 1982) (quoting In re Hanson,
103 N.W.2d at 864). While acknowledging that “natural human sympathy” cannot
deter the court from protecting the public, the court nonetheless placed an
eighty-eight year old lawyer whose improper litigation conduct and failure to
cooperate were “obviously . . . a result of the lawyer’s advanced age rather than
moral shortcomings,” on inactive status rather than indefinitely suspending him
since the discipline was not appropriate or necessary to protect the public. Id.
171. See In re Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 18 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than
disbarring lawyer to permit him to seek reinstatement after receiving psychological
or psychiatric treatment and seek to rehabilitate himself to “once again be
restored as a worthy and contributing member of the Minnesota bar”); In re
O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than disbarring
lawyer in order to give him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself. “If his
alcoholism can be arrested, we are convinced he can be restored as a contributing
and worthy member of the Minnesota bar.”).
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Minnesota’s disciplinary history recognizes impairment as a
mitigating factor that allows rehabilitation:
Although alcoholism in and of itself is not a defense
to professional misconduct, it can be a mitigating
factor in determining the appropriate disciplinary
sanction.
Here, there are grounds for the
immediate disbarment of Fallon. That extreme
discipline, however, is not imposed.
Fallon’s
misconduct apparently stems from chronic
alcoholism and he should be given an opportunity
to rehabilitate himself. If Fallon’s illness can be
arrested, he will likely be, as he once was, a
contributing and worthy member of the bar. Until
he is rehabilitated, however, he is not fit to practice
172
law and the public must be protected.
Whether or not rehabilitation and empathy are officially
accepted in our disciplinary jurisprudence, the court has paused
before imposing the extreme consequence of the disbarment on a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, should not be ousted from
the profession. The reasons have been many, or sometimes not
even stated, but there are many lawyers who engaged in
misappropriation or conduct that resulted in felony convictions
173
On the other hand,
who were not ousted from the profession.
there are plenty of lawyers who engaged in similar conduct and
174
have been found undeserving of a less extreme sanction.
Of
172. In re Fallon, 389 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1986).
173. See, e.g., In re Lahlum, 719 N.W.2d 707, 707–08 (Minn. 2006) (felony
theft); In re Post, 686 N.W.2d 529, 529 (Minn. 2004) (felony DWI); In re Singer,
630 N.W.2d 404, 404 (Minn. 2001) (felony theft for misappropriating funds from
trust account); In re Barta, 461 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1990) (tax fraud and
evasion); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179, 179–80 (Minn. 1988) (dismissing traffic
tickets for favors and failing to file income tax returns); In re Kimmel, 322 N.W.2d
224, 226–27 (Minn. 1982) (felony criminal sexual conduct); In re Scholle, 274
N.W.2d 112, 113 (Minn. 1978) (conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine); In re
Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 835, 837 (Minn. 1978) (securities fraud and felony
theft); In re Swagler, 239 Minn. 566, 566, 58 N.W.2d 272, 272 (1953) (criminal
negligence).
174. See In re Rothstein, 777 N.W.2d 31, 31 (Minn. 2010) (lawyer
misappropriating funds from his law firm convicted of felony theft by swindle); In
re Foster, 771 N.W.2d 512, 512 (Minn. 2009) (felony involving dishonesty); In re
Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 603–04 (Minn. 2007) (lawyer convicted of attempted
theft by swindle of money from client); In re Giberson, 735 N.W.2d 683, 683
(Minn. 2007) (willful failure to pay child support); In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285,
286–87 (Minn. 2006) (lawyer convicted of thirty-three felony counts, including
mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering); In re Perez, 688 N.W.2d 562, 565,
569 (Minn. 2004) (mail fraud); In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 154 (Minn.
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these, none had engaged in misconduct while they were impaired,
as Rodriguez and Mayne undoubtedly did; and none of them took
175
money to satisfy their addictions or compulsions, as Rodriguez
176
and Mayne appear to have done.
Recognizing that chemical dependency and mental illness
inordinately affect the legal profession and cause lawyers to engage
in behaviors that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct is one
reason to pause. Recognizing that the public is protected when a
lawyer seeks appropriate treatment to effectively address the illness
and prevent future misconduct is another. Empathy for those who
suffer from these illnesses and encouragement of rehabilitation are
merely additional benefits. Had the court suspended Mayne and
Rodriguez indefinitely, the sanction would have been a serious one
that would have protected the public and sent the message to the
public and the profession that the conduct is not tolerated; it
would have also sent the message that the legal profession
177
encourages rehabilitation.
C. The Balance
The role of the Minnesota Supreme Court is to discipline
lawyers in the interests of the public and the profession, not to
show empathy for lawyers who engage in misconduct while they are
impaired.
However, Minnesota’s discipline jurisprudence
demonstrates the court’s ability to protect the interests of the
public and the profession while allowing impaired lawyers to
rehabilitate themselves. Mitigation for lawyer impairment serves

2004) (money laundering); In re Klane, 659 N.W.2d 701, 701 (Minn. 2003) (felony
mail fraud); In re Amundson, 643 N.W.2d 280, 280–81 (Minn. 2002) (five counts
of felony theft by swindle and misappropriation of client funds).
175. See In re Rothstein, 777 N.W.2d at 31; In re Giberson, 735 N.W.2d at 683; In re
Andrade, 736 N.W.2d at 604; In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d at 286; In re Perez, 688 N.W.2d
at 563–64; In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d at 154–55; In re Klane, 659 N.W.2d at 701;
In re Amundson, 643 N.W.2d at 280.
176. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2010); In re Rodriguez, 783
N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 2010).
177. See In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“If we
disbar Rodriguez, there will be one less reason for him to work toward recovery. If
we suspend him indefinitely, he will have an extremely steep hill to climb in order
to be reinstated, but foreclosing that possibility does not further any of our stated
goals in lawyer discipline cases. Here, disbarment does not protect the public
more than indefinite suspension would; nor does it do more to safeguard the
administration of justice. Further, disbarment will not likely deter similar conduct
by other lawyers.”).
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these interests.
When viewed from that perspective, the
disbarments of Mayne and Rodriguez are neither just nor right.
Establishing and defining a direct causation standard,
removing other obstacles, and separating concepts of excuse and
defense from mitigation would result in the mitigation for lawyer
impairment functioning as it was meant to function. Nothing in
the history of either Minnesota’s or the ABA’s adoption of
mitigating factors suggests that mitigation for psychological or
other disabilities should be treated with any more suspicion than
any of the other mitigating factors.
The ABA’s specific
identification of impairments as mitigating factors and articulation
of the criteria were intended to promote consistency in recognizing
that impairments that cause misconduct that are successfully
treated and give assurances that misconduct will not recur serve to
protect the public and the profession and should mitigate
178
discipline.
Our abhorrence of misappropriation or crimes of dishonesty
by our colleagues, skepticism, or our lack of familiarity with
psychological disorders should not blind us to the fact that
psychological impairments may cause lawyers who are otherwise
179
honest to behave in ways inconsistent with their character.
Recognizing impairment as a mitigating factor does not mean the
court or the profession condones, accepts, defends, or excuses the
behavior. It allows imposition of a sanction that takes into account
that the impairment has been effectively treated and misconduct is
not likely to recur. It also sends the message that the legal
profession, including its disciplinary system, supports the recovery
and rehabilitation of impaired lawyers.
Education is also necessary to dispel misunderstanding and
misconceptions of impairments to ensure proper respect for the
role of mental health professionals and the complex nature of
diagnosis and the variability of psychological illnesses.
For
example, understanding the following may avoid a misconception
that a lawyer can or must prove that he or she was under the
influence of alcohol or in a particular mental state on a particular
day when he or she engaged in misconduct:

178. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.3, 9.3 cmt. (1991).
179. See In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Minn. 1982) (recognizing the
“numerous members of the legal profession whose conduct due to alcoholism had
seriously affected their ability to maintain the standards of the profession . . .”).
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An impaired lawyer’s mental condition may
fluctuate over time. Certain dementias or psychoses
may impair a lawyer’s performance on “bad days,”
but not on “good days” during which the lawyer
behaves normally. Substance abusers may be able to
provide competent and diligent representation
during sober or clean interludes, but may be unable
to do so during short or extended periods in which
180
the abuse occurs.
Common understanding of behaviors typically associated with
alcoholism, such as denial and impaired judgment, have resulted in
181
recognition of its impact within the disciplinary system, just as
certain types of misconduct have come to be associated with
182
depression.
The mitigation criteria should be applied in a
manner that avoids creating obstacles to understanding our
growing knowledge of impairments that affect lawyers and result in
discipline.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In re Mayne and In re Rodriguez demonstrate that our mitigation
standard has become an obstacle to recognizing lawyer impairment
as a mitigating factor. These decisions represent the culmination
of a jurisprudence that has come to treat impairment mitigation as
an excuse or a defense. As such, it is subjected to a higher level of
proof than other mitigating factors. Its threshold criterion has
been defined piecemeal in litigation and frequently without regard
to the science of mental and chemical dependency and the
testimony of its professionals. Its undefined and shifting causation
standard is nearly impossible to meet.
The decisions also appear to mark a turn from jurisprudence
that allowed the court to mitigate the sanction of disbarment when
disbarment was not necessary to protect the public and—when
appropriate—to ameliorate the impact of the rigid mitigation
criteria for those lawyers whose impairment leads to active
misconduct. Concepts of compassion and rehabilitation are
180. ABA Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal
Op. 03-429 (2003).
181. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 617.
182. See, e.g., In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2010). Although
mental impairments are most likely to cause violations of Rule 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4,
they may result in the violation of other rules. ABA Compendium of Prof’l
Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal Op. 03-429 (2003).
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consistent with protection of the public and the profession and can
be accomplished by removing the obstacles that have been placed
in the way of treating impairment as a mitigating factor.
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